Kevin Coit v. Mr. Garman by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-5-2020 
Kevin Coit v. Mr. Garman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Kevin Coit v. Mr. Garman" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 484. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/484 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2580 
___________ 
 
KEVIN COIT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
Mr. GARMAN, (Facility Manager); 
 Mr. PASQUALE (Unit Manager); 
 HARSHBARGER; Lt. GATES; 
 LYTLE; CLEVELAND; CO CONDO; CO FLOREY; 
 CO CONKLIN; CO SEYMOUR; 
 CO Ward; CO EDWARDS; 
 HEARING EXAMINER PILOSI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-01438) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2020 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2020) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Kevin Coit, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the defendants.  For the reasons detailed below, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
Coit, who was previously housed at SCI-Rockview, brought this action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against 12 prison officials at that institution, asserting claims under the 
First and Eighth Amendments for excessive force, sexual assault, failure to protect, 
deliberate indifference, excessive cell searches, unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement, retaliation, and denial of access to the courts.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on the merits.1 
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows.  On February 24, 2017, Coit was 
handcuffed so he could be brought to participate in a mental health program.  He refused 
a pat down and was placed back in his cell, where he refused to let officers remove his 
handcuffs.  A struggle ensued, during which Coit claims the officers used excessive force 
and inserted an object into his anus.  The incident was recorded on video.  After the 
handcuffs were removed, Coit began cutting himself with a piece of glass from a broken 
desk light.  He was then escorted to the medical unit for treatment.  After this incident, 
Coit’s cell was searched six or seven times over the next two months.   
 
1 We note that the defendants also argued that Coit had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  The District Court disagreed, concluding that he had properly 
exhausted.  The defendants have not challenged that holding on appeal. 
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On March 22, 2017, Coit told a prison official that another inmate, Jones, had 
threatened to stab him.  Later that day, as Coit was being escorted, Jones pounced on him 
and stabbed him several times in the back of the head with a piece of metal mesh.  
Officers quickly moved to protect Coit, and he was immediately given medical attention.  
The wound did not require bandages or stitches.  The stabbing incident was recorded on 
video.   
On April 10, 2017, Coit was involuntarily escorted to the medical unit after he 
refused 10 consecutive meals.  He claimed a correctional officer punched him in the back 
of the head en route, and that, upon arrival, corrections officers used excessive force in 
removing his clothes and placing him in a suicide smock.  He also claimed an officer 
inserted a finger into his anus.  During the incident, Coit resisted and ended up face first 
on the floor, resulting in minor injuries to his nose and lip. This incident was also 
recorded on video.   
At a disciplinary hearing held on April 17, 2017, Coit pleaded guilty to charges of 
threatening and assaulting an officer by throwing a cup of liquid at the officer.  Coit said 
it was water; the charges claimed it was urine.  He was sentenced to 180 days of 
disciplinary conduct (the maximum amount permissible).  He was also found guilty of a 
charge of unauthorized use of a telephone.  He lost phone privileges for 180 days. 
From May 16, 2017 through May 30, 2017, Coit was confined in his cell in the 
secure residential treatment unit for 24 hours a day, with the lights on, no running water, 
and “very little food.”  The cell was cold and he was deprived of a blanket and sheets.  
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Coit smeared his own feces and blood on the wall; he cut himself with a staple to produce 
the blood. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants.   See 
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).   
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the 
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions” of the record 
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving 
party then must present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A 
court should grant summary judgment where the non-movant’s evidence is merely 
colorable or not significantly probative, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, because “[w]here 
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial,’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 
 
III. 
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We begin by noting that Coit has waived his claim for denial of access to the 
courts by failing to raise them in his brief.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening 
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  The defendants assert that Coit has 
waived his other claims by failing to raise them on appeal.  However, we conclude that 
Coit’s other claims were properly presented in his brief. 
With regard to Coit’s Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force, sexual 
assault, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference concerning the incidents of 
February 24, March 22, and April 10, 2017, we conclude that summary judgment was 
properly granted in favor of the defendants for the reasons explained by the District 
Court.  In short, our review of the video evidence confirmed that the defendants were 
clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding these claims.  See Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one 
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe 
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.”). 
Defendants were also entitled to summary judgment as to Coit’s claim for 
excessive cell searches.  The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their cells, but has noted that the Eighth Amendment protects 
prisoners against corrections officers “rid[ing] roughshod over inmates’ property rights 
with impunity,” in a “calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.”  Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).  As explained by the District Court, there is no 
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genuine issue of material fact that the searches, which began after Coit’s February 24, 
2017 self-mutilation, were for his safety, and not to harass him.   
With regard to Coit’s retaliation claim, the defendants concede that filing 
grievances is a constitutionally protected activity, and that excessive disciplinary time can 
constitute an adverse action.2  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A 
prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an 
adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his 
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.”) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  With regard to a causal link, the District Court concluded that 
Coit had “presented no evidence to suggest that the sanction imposed by defendant Pilosi 
was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  (Dkt. No. 85 at 21).  
However, in his sworn complaint, Coit alleged that after defendant Pilosi, the hearing 
officer, imposed his disciplinary time, she told him “this is what you get for filing 
grievances and making p.r.e.a complaints.”3  As acknowledged by the District Court, (id. 
at 5 n.3), a sworn complaint can be treated as an affidavit on summary judgment.  See, 
e.g., Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985).   
The defendants argue that summary judgment was properly granted in light of 
Coit’s response at his deposition to the question of why he believed that defendant Pilosi 
was biased against him: “Because they had no evidence to support any of the allegations.  
 
2 The defendants do not concede that Coit’s disciplinary time was excessive. 
3 Presumably, “p.r.e.a” referred to the Prison Rape Elimination Act 
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She had told me personally that this is what I get for assaulting her officers.”  (Dkt. No. 
60-1 at 74).  Given that one of the charges to which Coit pleaded guilty was for assault 
(although he denied that there was urine in the cup he had thrown), Pelosi’s attributed 
statement does not evince a motive to retaliate, but rather provides a logical explanation 
for the sanction imposed.  In other words, the statement appears to be little more than an 
observation that prison rules provide for punishment for disciplinary infractions.  
Furthermore, nowhere in Coit’s responsive filings to the summary judgment motion did 
he assert that defendant Pilosi told him that he was being sanctioned for filing grievances 
or complaints.  In light of the glaring omission of Coit’s key complaint allegation from 
both his deposition testimony and his filings in response to the summary judgment 
motion, we will consider this allegation, in these circumstances, to effectively be a sham 
affidavit, and conclude that no reasonable jury could afford it evidentiary weight.  See 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587  (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”) 
(citation omitted); cf. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 547 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing the sham affidavit doctrine; i.e., a contradictory sworn statement or 
omission); Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).4  
Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately granted with respect to the retaliation 
claim. 
 
4 Although typically we have applied the sham affidavit doctrine when the affidavit in 
question was filed in response to a summary judgment motion, given the circumstances 
of this case, we find that it is applicable here. 
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The District Court also appropriately granted summary judgment on Coit’s 
conditions-of-confinement claim.  Although Coit claimed that from May 16 through May 
29, 2017, he was confined in a cold cell with no sheets or blankets, he testified at his 
deposition that he was given a suicide smock after a few hours.  It is undisputed that he 
was coming off of a suicide attempt, thus providing legitimate penological reason for 
removing items from the cell (such as sheets, blankets, and pillows), which he could use 
to either harm himself or block guards from observing his condition.  Cf. Mammana v. 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that the plaintiff had an 
Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim where, inter alia, plaintiff was kept 
in a cold cell with paper thin clothing for four days, and noting that “denying a prisoner 
appropriate clothing with no legitimate penological reason may offend the Eighth 
Amendment.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, Coit’s 
allegations that his cell was cold were vague and conclusory and did not elaborate with 
specificity regarding the severity of the cold or the harm he faced.  See id. at 373 (noting 
that the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and that for a 
successful claim, an inmate must show that he is incarcerated “under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that conclusory 
statements are insufficient to withstand summary judgment); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 
F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that “vague statements” are insufficient to create a 
material question of fact precluding summary judgment).  Furthermore, although Coit 
claimed he received “very little food” and that the water in his cell was shut off, it was 
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undisputed that he had a history of engaging in hunger strikes (including during the 
month prior), he in no way elaborated on what “very little food” constituted, and by all 
indications in the record he had access to drinking water (just not running water).  See 
Mammana, 934 F.3d at 373; Paladino, 885 F.3d at 208; Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 500.  He 
also did not allege or testify as to any issues that arose from his bare bones claim of not 
having running water.  Cf. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (“When 
viewed in their totality, the alleged actions of Lewisburg prison officials -- not allowing 
Young to leave his cell more than once to defecate or urinate over a period of several 
days, not providing Young with a plastic urinal for 29 hours, not allowing Young to 
empty his urinal more than twice, not allowing Young to wash his hands before eating, 
not allowing Young to bathe or shower, not providing Young with toilet paper despite his 
diarrhea, not providing Young with water to drink, suggesting instead that he drink his 
urine, and the mocking taunts by guards and their threats to chain Young to a steel slab if 
he complained about his conditions -- would if proved demonstrate a violation of the 
basic concepts of humanity and decency that are at the core of the protections afforded by 
the Eighth Amendment.”).  The totality of these alleged circumstances, combined with 
Coit’s claim that he smeared his own feces and blood on the wall, are insufficient to 
support an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.   
Lastly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coit’s motion for 
appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993).  While 
it seems apparent that Coit suffers from some mental health issues, he nonetheless seems 
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capable of adequately proceeding in a pro se capacity.  Cf. Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 
301 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
